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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems clear that the world community is on the forward edge
of major changes in the law of the sea. The arrangements provided
in the treaties of 1958' and 1960,2 imprecise at such crucial points
as the breadth of the territorial sea' and the outer limits of the
continental shelf,' have substantially eroded, and something else
must take their place. Although the United Nations Conference on
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Some of the ideas contained in this article were presented in a different form in BALL,
LAW OF THE SEA: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS (Monog. No. 1, The Dean Rusk Center, 1978).
' Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964); Convention on the High
Seas, done April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept.
30, 1962); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, done April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective
March 20, 1966); Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964).
2 See G.A. Res. 1307, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 54, U.N. Doc. AIL 253 (1958). Dean,
The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 75 (1960).
' The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, note 1 supra, provided for
coastal nation rights to belts of adjacent waters, baselines from which to measure such
waters, the right of innocent passage through them, and contiguous zones beyond. But it
did not provide a specific breadth for territorial seas.
' The Convention on the Continental Shelf, note 1 supra, defined the area of national
jurisdiction as the "seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but out-
side the areas of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the
said areas." "Exploitability" is a concept rather than a measure and does not fix a definite
limit. See ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 167 (1963); Brown, The Outer
Limit of the Continental Shelf, 1968 JURID. REV. 111 (1968).
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the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 5 has proceeded with glacial speed
through seven sessions over a period of five years, there seems to
be a growing consensus on more and more of the many elements
in a comprehensive law of the sea treaty.'
If hopes for an international treaty prove illusory, then we can
expect that individual nations, including the United States, will
act unilaterally to assert their national interests. The United
States has already extended its management of fisheries out to
200 miles.7 In the absence of a treaty, congressional movement can
be expected to enable United States companies to exploit the non-
living resources of the deep seabeds,8 establish a more general
economic zone,' clarify our view of the outer limits of the continen-
tal shelf,1" and extend the territorial sea from three to twelve miles."
I Preparation for the UNCLOS began in 1971 when the U.N. General Assembly called for
the 1973 convening of the Conference. G.A. Res. 2750 c, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970).
' The most recent meeting of the Conference was held in New York Aug. 21-Sept. 15,
1978. The Conference is scheduled to meet again for six weeks in Geneva beginning March
19, 1979. At the conclusion of the "resumed" seventh session in September, Ambassador
Elliot L. Richardson, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Con-
ference, reported some further progress toward a comprehensive treaty but with no con-
sensus yet achieved on several items, including the most controversial of all, a regime for
deep seabed mining. The Conference has produced an Informal Composite Negotiating Text
(I.C.N.T.) which embodies a number of points on which consensus has been tentatively
reached, including inter alia provisions for a twelve-mile territorial sea, I.C.N.T., Art. 3,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 (1977), a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, Id. Art. 57, and a
continental shelf to the outer edge of the continental margin or a distance of 200 miles, Id.
Art. 76, See generally, e.g., Charney, Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock, 55 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 598 (1977); Law of the Sea X, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 357 (1978).
' Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, tit. 1, § 101, Pub. L. 94-265, 90 Stat.
336 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
s The House of Representatives has passed a bill providing for United States licensing of
deep seabed mining. H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H 7341 (daily ed. July
26, 1978), passed as amended by House, 124 CONG. REC. H 7382-83 (daily ed. July 26, 1978).
A similar bill was passed by two committees of the Senate but did not reach the floor. [1978]
9 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 1184 (Oct. 20, 1978), 2nd [19781 36 Cong. Q. 3010 (Oct. 21, 1978).
' In addition to fishery jurisdiction, the United States also claims jurisdiction to the
200-mile limit for certain environment purposes. See Clean Water Act of Dec. 27, 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-217 § 58(a-(c), 91 Stat. 1593 (extending coverage of oil and hazardous spill provi-
sions from 12 to 200 miles); Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372 § 204, 92 Stat. 629
amending § 5(a)(8) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (providing for
applicability of ambient air quality standards to continental shelf exploration and develop-
ment).
o The United States has never set continental shelf limits with any greater clarity than
that observed by the Geneva convention, note 1 supra, except that when the shelf was first
claimed as appertaining to the U.S., a press release at the time set the limit at the
100-fathom depth. White House Press Release, Sept. 28, 1945, 13 DEPT. STATE BULL. 484
(1945).
" See notes 31, 32. 45, 46, 47, 56, 57 infra and accompanying text.
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It is understandable that governmental and private interest has
been concentrated thus far on the international aspects of the law
of the sea. Very little attention has been given in recent years to
the impact of these prospective changes upon the internal ar-
rangements of the United States, such as the many questions
which will arise about the sharing of responsibilities between the
Federal government and individual States. The purpose of this ar-
ticle is to raise some of these questions in the hope that solutions
may be found on a considered basis rather than through helter-
skelter, impulsive reactions as particular issues arise for decision.
II. CURRENT FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN UNITED
STATES OCEANS POLICY-TOTAL CONFUSION
Our national life has always been shaped in important respects
by the sea around us. Growing needs for fish and oil can only in-
crease its influence. By the year 2000, according to one estimate,
80 percent of the population will live within fifty miles of the
coast." Already the sea is a source for food, fuel, weather, military
defense, recreation, mythology, and garbage disposal. It may
become as well a living space, a generator of consumable energy,
and a supply of potable water.
Notwithstanding past and future dependence upon the sea, the
United States lacks an oceans policy. What substitutes for a policy
is a congeries of functional Federal and State agency operations
lacking coherence and direction.
For many years, coastal States claimed title to the land underly-
ing the territorial sea.'3 The Truman Proclamations of 194514 an-
nounced that this country regarded the continental shelf as "ap-
pertaining" to the United States. They were accompanied by a
1" National Journal Dec. 9, 1972, cited in THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE 162 (1976) ("[Bly the end of the century, there may be almost as many people
in the Nation's coastal zone as there are now people in the entire United States." Id. at 21).
13 See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 23-24, 38-40 (1947); Id. at 43 (Reed, J.,
dissenting); Ireland, Marginal Seas Around the States, 2 LA. L. REV. 252 (1940); Comment,
Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in Submerged Lands of the Continental
Shelf 56 YALE L. J. 356 (1947).
" One proclamation concerned Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Con-
tinental Shelf Presidential Proclamation 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Comp.), reprinted in 59
Stat. 884 (1945). The other dealt with Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas.
Presidential Proclamation 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48 Comp.), reprinted in 59 Stat. 885
(1945).
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press release explaining that the newly proclaimed position did
"not touch upon the question of Federal versus State control.' 15
Then in 1947 the Supreme Court held that the Federal govern-
ment, as against the States, has paramount rights in the ter-
ritorial sea, "an incident to which is full dominion over the
resources of the soil under that water area, including oil."'"
However, in 1953 Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act'7
which established coastal States' seaward boundaries at the three-
mile limit and vested in the States title to the corresponding lands
beneath. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,'8 enacted later
in the same year, gave statutory expression to United States con-
trol of the continental shelf and designated that portion of it
beyond the territorial sea as an area of exclusive Federal jurisdic-
tion.
This division whereby the States "own" the territorial sea and
the Federal government "owns" the area to seaward is no more
tidy than the boundary is visible. Each sovereign has acknowl-
edged interests in the zone of the other.
When the Congress ceded title to the territorial sea to the
States, it expressly reserved for the United States paramount
rights with respect to commerce, navigation, defense, and interna-
tional affairs. 9 The strength and vitality of these Federal rights in
State waters have been recently re-affirmed by the courts.'
Moreover, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
197621 contains a fresh statutory assertion of them. The chief pur-
pose of the act was the extension of fishery jurisdiction to 200
miles, but it also provides that, under special circumstances spelled
out in the statute, the Federal government may regulate fishing
within a State's territorial sea."
As a reverse corollary, there is in turn a growing appreciation
of State interests in the area "owned" by the Federal government.
Mineral resource development, oil spills and fishing may take
1" White House Press Release, Sept. 28, 1945, 13 DEPT. STATE BULL. 484 (1945).
" United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947).
17 Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1311-15 (1970).
11 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. 67-212, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-43 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
" 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1970).
21 See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S.Ct. 989 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast Pro-
ducts, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 910 (1971).
" Pub. L. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 22 U.S.C.).
n 16 U.S.C. § 1856(6) (1976).
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place beyond the territorial sea but have ecological, economic, and
social effects upon adjacent State waters and coasts.2 1 State in-
terests in such activities have been recognized in the law. The
courts have allowed the States some control seaward of territorial
limits. For example, the Supreme Court of Alaska upheld certain
of that State's conservation measures restricting the King Crab
season in the Bering Strait outside State waters. 4
Like the courts, Congress has also recognized State interests
beyond the territorial sea. The Coastal Zone Management Act of
19725 is a prime example. This act is designed to encourage the
States to manage their coastal resources. One of the statutory
means employed to that end is the not uncommon one of the offer
of supportive financing.2" Another is more novel: the offer of a
share of power. If a State has an approved coastal management
program, then it may exert extraterritorial influence. Amend-
ments to the Act in 1976 specified that outer continental shelf ac-
tivities undertaken or licensed by the Federal government must
be "consistent" with a State's plan."
State programs have been slow to be created and approved.
The plans of thirteen states are now in place.28 Whether the "con-
sistency" approach will actually prove effective remains to be set-
tled.' Nevertheless, the Coastal Zone Management Act does
recognize state interests, and the requirement that continental
shelf activities be conformed to State policies is a potentially
significant response. 0
Besides the statutory provisions already mentioned, there is a
' See generally COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OCS OIL AND GAS-AN EN-
VIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1974); Id, OIL AND GAS IN
COASTAL LANDS AND WATERS (1977); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT; COASTAL EFFECTS
OF OFFSHORE ENERGY SYSTEMS (1976).
' State v. Sieminski, 556 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1976); State v. Bundrant 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska
1976).
- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976).
"8 Id at § 1456(a).
' Id. at §§ 1456(c)(1)(2).
2' COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT NEWSLETTER, Vol. 9, No. 39, Oct. 4, 1978, at p. 1.
2' Court challenges have been brought against approved State coastal management plans
and the notion of consistency in only three cases. All were brought by the oil industry. The
challenges to the Massachusetts and Wisconsin plans were dismissed. American Petroleum
Institute v. Knecht, Nos. 78-623, 78-684 (U.S.D.C. D.C. Sept. 6, 1978). The California plan
was upheld in a trial on the merits. American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, No. CV
7703375-RJK (U.S.D.C. Cent. D. Calif. Sept. 1, 1978).
' See Omang, States Rights vs. Federal Power in Coastal Waters, The Washington
Post, Oct. 1, 1978, p. C3, col. 3.
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bewildering array of others touching upon Federal-State relation-
ships in both the territorial sea and the area beyond. A sampling
will suffice:
-The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
created Regional Fishery Management Councils which give the
States an advisory role in fishery management in the two-
hundred mile zone" (and may have established grounds for ex-
traterritorial State jurisdiction in some circumstances).2 But, as
noted, it also provides for Federal rule-making authority over a
State's waters under certain conditions.33
-The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978"
provide for review by, consultation with, and information dis-
closure to States concerning lease sales as well as development
and production plans on the outer continental shelf. 5 Regula-
tions for lease sales already embody many of these measures.3
-The Deepwater Ports Act of 1974,"7 allows a coastal State to
exercise veto power over superports. (A veto is not allowed for
development of resources under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act; only consultation is provided.) The act authorizes
Federal licensing for construction and operation of such ports,
only if the Governor of "the adjacent coastal State or States" ap-
proves or is presumed to approve it.35
-The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Deepwater
Ports Act 4 make adjacent State civil and criminal law applicable
to artificial islands and ports off of their coast. Such laws are
adopted as Federal law to the extent that they apply and are not
inconsistent with other Federal law and regulation. That is, they
are surrogate Federal law.
16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976).
Id § 1856(a). But see Curtis, Alaska's Regulation of King Crab on the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf, 6 UCLA-ALAS. L. REV. 375, 407 (1977).
' See note 23 supra.
, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-372, Sept. 18,
1978, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
' Id. at § 204, amending 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(h); § 205, amending 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g); § 206,
amending 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(2); § 208, adding 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a)(2)(F); (c)(1) and (2); (f); §
1345; § 1346(c); § 1351(a)(3), (f); § 1352(b)(2)(d)(2).
35 43 Fed. Reg. 3883 (1978) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 250.34); 43 Fed. Reg. 3889 (1978)
(to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250); 43 Fed. Reg. 3895 (1978) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §
3301.8); DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS
ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 5 (1977).
3, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (Supp. V 1975).
38 Id. §§ 1503(c)(9), 1508(b).
" 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2).
"8 33 U.S.C. § 1518.
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-The National Environmental Policy Act" mandates the filing
of environmental impact statements for major Federal actions,
and the adoption by Federal agencies of procedures for consider-
ing environmental values. It has served as a major avenue for
State and citizen impact on Federal decisions affecting the sea
and seabed, but it suffers from the drawbacks inherent in all
resort to the judiciary.
Two things emerge from a reading of this and other law. One is
that the unseen boundary which divides what the States "own"
from what the Federal government "owns" of the sea is no barrier
to perception in the law of the interests of one sovereign in the
area allotted to the other. The second is that this perception of
mutual transfrontier interests has not been accompanied by any
ordering of Federal-State relations in the governance of marine
resources. Instead of order there is confusion.
Absent a rational, controlling oceans policy, Federal-State rela-
tions have been abandoned to shifting, discrete necessities and a
burgeoning bureaucracy. Power is exercised by numerous Federal
and State agencies with often competing and conflicting inter-
ests.43 (At the Federal level these agencies include the Coast
Guard, the Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
United States Geological Survey, and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment.) Public interest in the sea is not served by the resultant
lack of coherence.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
" 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970); 43 C.F.R. § 3301.3 (1976).
"3 One list in 1977 included twenty-one marine activities at the Federal level under the
jurisdiction of six departments and five agencies. Hollings, First Annual Doherty Lecture
in Oceans Policy, 11 MARINE TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY J., July-Aug. 1977, at 30, 31 (1977). Since
then the Department of Energy has been created so that seven departments are now in-
volved.
" One recent study found hope for improvement in the marine sanctuaries program on
the ground that it might serve as the key to a comprehensive and balanced approach to
marine resources. Blumm and Blumstein, The Marine Sanctuaries Program: A Framework
for Critical Areas Management in the Sea, 8 ENVIR. L. REV. 50016 (1978).
This program was established by Title III of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanc-
tuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 (1976), referred to as the "Ocean Dumping Act"
because of the better known Title I which regulates dumping. Title II created
oceanographic research programs. Under Title III marine areas may be designated as sanc-
tuaries for their conservation, recreational, ecological, or esthetic value and then managed
so as to preserve and restore them. Id. at § 1432(a). The program guidelines provide for
multiple use management so that uses compatabile with a sanctuary's primary purpose are
permissible.
Only two areas have been designated as sanctuaries to date: a one-square-mile site
1979]
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III. OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRESH START-EXTENSION OF THE
UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL SEA FROM 3 TO 12 MILES
In order to provide a realistic environment for the development
of a comprehensive oceans policy it is critical, considering the pres-
ent state of confusion, to have a clean slate. Obviously, one cannot
simply repeal the morass of overlapping legislation; however, a
somewhat fresh start can be achieved in another manner. We pro-
pose that the United States consider extending its territorial sea
from three to twelve miles. Preliminary debate about and then im-
plementation of a territorial sea change would provide a context
for re-thinking Federal-State relations; for development of a com-
prehensive oceans policy; and for meaningful public participation
in complex governmental affairs. In a word the territorial sea and
an alteration of its boundaries offer a singular opportunity for car-
rying forward the American experiment. Success in this mat-
ter - or an instructive failure - would constitute a major contribu-
tion to the world community, which has undertaken its own search
for modes of governance for natural resources in the face of grow-
ing scarcity.
Before any further discussion of this proposal, a preliminary
question must be answered: would extension of the territorial sea
of the United States have international repercussions of such a
nature as to argue against the change? We think not.
Indeed, we believe the international repercussions would be
minimal. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text developed by
the UNCLOS reflect a strong consensus for recognition of ter-
ritorial seas to a breadth of twelve miles. For all practical pur-
poses, the United States recognizes the claims of other nations to
the twelve-mile limit.45 (Some ninety coastal nations claim a ter-
around the sunken U.S.S. Monitor off Cape Hatteras and the 100-square-mile Key Largo
Coral Reef off Florida. However, the sanctuaries program has been the subject of recent at-
tention and was specifically recognized in President Carter's Environmental Message of
May 23, 1977.
The program does hold promise insofar as it would allow for positive, flexible and balanced
management in tandem with public involvement (since areas may be nominated to the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for inclusion by any member of the public.)
On the other hand, the promise is not unbounded. The program is directed at too limited a
potential area to serve as the focal point of a national oceans policy, and, more importantly,
it also is beset with uncertainty in the allotment of Federal-State responsibility, see Blum
and Blumstein, supra.
11 For example, the United States has observed the 12-mile limits claimed by both Russia
and China. See S. SWARZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 237 (1972).
[Vol. 9:1
SEA CHANGES
ritorial sea broader than three miles.)" The original United States
hope to use the breadth of the territorial sea as a bargaining chip
to obtain satisfactory rules regarding the passage of straits has
largely withered away, partly because it is clear that a three-mile
limit cannot be sustained and partly because there has been gen-
uine progress towards satisfactory rules on straits' passage. An
American extension of territorial sea limits would not likely elicit
retaliatory response and would end the practice, a kind of self-
denying ordinance, whereby we acknowledge the claims of others
to boundaries which we do not allow to ourselves.
If United States action or simply growing practice did lead all
coastal nations to move territorial boundaries to the twelve-mile
limit, then the chief problem would be that of military and com-
mercial passage of straits. There are one hundred forty straits in
use by shipping." One hundred sixteen would be overlapped by a
twelve-mile territorial sea. Among them would be most of the
thirty-five straits used by United States ships, including Dover
and Gibralter, which account for a considerable proportion in
trade dollars. 9
The UNCLOS has developed a new and satisfactory rule for
straits embraced by territorial seas. Its solution, embodied in the
Negotiating Text, is to provide for "transit passage" through
straits "which are used for international navigation between one
area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone."' "Transit
passage" is defined as the exercise "of the freedom of navigation
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and ex-
peditious transit."'"
Nations bordering straits may make laws and regulations
relating to transit passage which may include safety and traffic
regulations, pollution control, prevention of fishing, and enforce-
ment of customs and immigration regulations."2 But the
Negotiating Text also provides that the adjacent nation's
measures "shall not discriminate in form or in fact amongst
"' Interview, Office of the Geographer, U.S. Dept. of State, June 13, 1978.
" See notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text.
" U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, GEOGRAPHIC BULL. No. 3, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 22-27 (1969).
"1 D. LOGUE & R. SWEENEY, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS 20
(American Enterprise Institute Original Paper 6, 1977).
Informal Composite Negotiating Text Art. 37.
" Id Art. 38.
, Id Arts. 37-38.
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foreign ships" or "have the practical effect of denying, hampering
or impairing the right of transit passage. '
Should the "transit passage" rule for straits not become fixed in
a comprehensive UN treaty, the United States could announce it
as nevertheless applying to those straits which would be affected
by a United States extension of territorial waters. (Of the several
straits which would be affected and which are used by shipping,
the principal ones are the Bering Strait, the Kaiwi Channel in
Hawaii, and the Unimak Pass in the Aleutians. The Strait of Juan
de Fuca connects Puget Sound and the Pacific Ocean. There are
some eleven other straits which would be affected but do not fall
along major shipping lanes.) Reciprocal treatment of their own
straits by other nations would be expected. Thus United States
shipping would be largely unaffected.
Even the total failure of the "transit passage" rule might not be
a fatal blow. Under the practices which are presently possible in
territorial seas and which would apply to straits overlapped by ex-
tended limits, shipping would be subject to one of four choices by
the nations adjacent to straits. One option would simply be to
allow free transit. This might even be the generally followed alter-
native since it would ultimately serve the interests of the border-
ing nations. Another choice would be to allow innocent passage,
the rule adopted by the 1958 Geneva Conference.' Innocent
passage provides for transit, but ships might be subject to search
and submarines must surface and show their flag." The third and
fourth choices, at least hypothetically possible, are charging tolls
for passage and closure-the denial of passage.
None of the four would present an insuperable barrier, especially
since bilateral agreements for transit are possible. In a word, no
foreseeable consequence of general expansion of territorial seas to
twelve miles would cripple United States shipping.
IV. AGENDA FOR ORDERING FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
WITHIN THE NEW TERRITORIAL SEA
The immediate effects of change in boundaries would be
domestic rather than international. Of course a twelve-mile rather
than a three-mile territorial sea could be a distinction which
Id Art. 42.
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, note 1 supra, Art. 14.
Id at Par. 6.
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makes no real difference domestically. The extension of limits,
that is to say, could be accompanied by a few administrative ad-
justments, by a laundering of applicable statutes to conform them
to the new distance, and by nothing more. This kind of non-event
is imaginable, but it is neither likely nor desirable. Necessarily,
more would have to happen.
A. Jurisdiction
One decision that would have to be made is that about jurisdic-
tion. Will the new nine-mile stretch of water and the underlying
bed belong to the Federal government or the adjacent coastal
States or both?
It could be contended that Congress meant by the Submerged
Lands Act to vest in the States title to the lands and waters of the
territorial sea whatever its extent. The language of the statute,
together with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and subse-
quent Supreme Court interpretation do not support such a posi-
tion." In all likelihood, the Congress would be required to act
again.
If it is assumed that past and existing commitments (leases, for
example) within the three to twelve mile area ought not to be
disturbed, there still remains the question of exploitation and
preservation of resources in the future. There is theoretical as
well as practical support for either Federal or State prerogative
in the power of disposition.
On the Federal side arguments could be advanced that the in-
terest of inland States and of all citizens, the history of the sea as
of national strategic importance, as well as greater naval and ad-
ministrative capacity, weigh in favor of Federal control.
On behalf of the States, it could be maintained that leaner, more
responsive agencies, closer familiarity with daily, mundane
marine-related affairs, and a diversity of local concerns render the
States the preferred government to exercise authority over an ex-
panded territorial sea.
B. Distribution of Revenue
Another basic decision which would have to be made is that of
' See, e.g., Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf
Mineral Resources, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1107, n. 23, 1113 (1976).
" See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
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distribution of income generated by exploitation of the resources
of the territorial sea: who gets how much for what purpose.
The division of revenue from activities on the Outer Continental
Shelf has been a matter of contention. Some monies are available
to the coastal States under the Coastal Energy Impact Program to
plan for and to manage the impact upon coastal zones of develop-
ment of outer continental shelf resources. 8 These funds were in-
creased by amendments included in the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978.1' The States believe the funds to
be both insufficient and distributed according to a defective form-
ula.6"
If a satisfactory formula for distribution is fashioned, should the
monies be earmarked for designated purposes? Such funds could
be restricted in a variety of ways. They might, for example, be
limited to marine and environmental ends. 1 Or, the funds could be
deposited in the treasury to meet general obligations.62
C. Legal and Managerial Problems
Policing and regulation of an expanded territorial sea is another
subject of minimally necessary action. Enforcement might pose
considerable difficulties for those States which lack the equipment
and personnel for it. But this incapacity ought not in itself
preclude State jurisdiction if other factors weighed in favor of it.
For example, there is no reason in theory why each coastal State
could not contract with the Federal government for such policing
16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(a); 1464(a)(3)(b) (1976).
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, note 32 supra, § 502, amend-
ing Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1464(a)(3). The authorization was in-
creased from fifty million dollars for each of eight years to one hundred thirty million
dollars for each of ten years. These are authorizations; actual appropriations have been con-
siderably less than the monies already authorized.
" See generally, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. EFFECTS
OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE 249-57 (1976);
Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, S. Rep. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
11-19 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1768, 1778-1787. Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Hearings on H.R. 1614 Before the House Ad. Hoc.
Comm. on Outer Continental Shelf, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1, at 430-31, 179-83, pt. 2 at
1183-87, 1580-82, 1588-89 (1977).
61 New Jersey earmarks revenue from its public trust tideland's to public educational
purposes. 18 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10-5 (1937).
62 Revenue from outer continental shelf lands leases are deposited into the Federal
treasury and credited to miscellaneous receipts 43 U.S.C. §§ 1337(g), 1338 (1970). However
some of these funds may be "covered over" to appropriations under the Land and Water
Conservation Fund Act of 1965. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11 (1976).
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and administrative needs as it finds necessary (the converse of
those arrangements whereby the United States contracts with the
States for the policing of certain Federal lands).3 Or, management
might be made a function of interstate agreements. The point is
that this is a matter for planning and decision.
V. AGENDA FOR ORDERING FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA
If the territorial sea were to be extended, then the foregoing
items would constitute a basic agenda. Actually, a territorial sea
change implicates much more.
A. Oceans Policy
The expansion of the territorial sea could serve as the occasion
for development of an oceans policy. Practically, as well as
theoretically, decisions precipitated by a change in territorial
boundaries could not be made in isolation from decisions involving
the areas both landward and seaward of the twelve-mile zone. An
extension of this zone would act as the stimulus to a more general
reckoning inclusive of all marine areas.
Landward of the territorial sea there is a constellation of issues
which have already been touched upon and which are pointedly
exemplified by the siting of support facilities, pipelines, storage
tanks, and oil, gas and hard mineral processing works. Federal
priority over and preemption of State action on such matters is
not settled in law or in political fact.
Seaward of the territorial sea lies the remainder of the two-
hundred mile zone, and then the high seas and deep seabed
beyond national jurisdiction. As noted earlier, the States have in-
terests in these politically and ecologically interdependent areas.
With respect to the two-hundred mile limit, it should be remarked
that the UNCLOS has provided for the included area to be an "ex-
clusive economic zone," in which the coastal nation would have in-
ter alia:
(a) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and ex-
ploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the seabed and subsoil and the
superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the
16 U.S.C. § l(a)-6(b) and (c).
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economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, current and wind; [and]
(b) Jurisdiction ... with regard to:
(i) The establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and structures;
(ii) Marine scientific research;
(iii) The preservation of the marine environment .... 6
Less is thereby given than is sought by those nations which
would like to establish a two-hundred mile territorial sea, but
more is provided than is presently claimed by the United States,
which asserts jurisdiction to two-hundred miles only for fishery
and some environmental purposes, and for exploration and
development of the continental shelf.
If the "exclusive economic zone" is embodied in a comprehen-
sive treaty or, failing that, becomes accepted international prac-
tice, then the United States would have to decide whether to
claim the full rights of an economic zone and to plan for one if it
did. Such planning would have to take account of administrative
and enforcement needs as well as of State interests, questions
which would already have been addressed and answered in the
context of an extended territorial sea.
In regard to deep seabed mining, interest is presently directed
to manganese nodules, the richest of which lie in areas on the
Pacific floor." The major minerals contained in these nodules are
cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel. United States industry im-
ports all four. There are several consortia with potential for com-
mercial ocean mining, perhaps by the mid-1980's.
It has been argued that the United States ought now unilaterally
to license mining of the deep seabed in order to protect United
States strategic interests against the possibilities of cartelization
and shortages of the minerals available from nodules.' In addition,
it has been said that such licensing would help overcome growing
Informal Composite Negotiating Text Art. 56.
See generally U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, OCEAN MINING ADMINISTRATION, OCEAN MIN-
ING: AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION (1976); U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, OCEAN MINING AD-
MINISTRATION, MANGANESE NODULE RESOURCES AND MINE SITE AVAILABILITY (1976); U.S.
CONGRESS. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND
TRANSPORTATION, JOINT HEARINGS ON MINING OF THE DEEP SEABED, Publication No. 95-78
(1978).
" See generally DISCOVERY II, Fall 1977, at 1, 3 (publication of the United Methodist
Joint Law of Sea Project); House debates on H.R. 3350, 124 CONG. REC. H 7341 (daily ed.
July 26, 1978).
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deficits to the balance of payments, encourage and protect in-
dustrial investment, and capitalize on the present lead of United
States technology in ocean mining and processing."
In opposition to the licensing bills presently before Congress, it
has been maintained that such action would constitute a symbolic
and economic threat to Third World Nations, that it might invite
direct or indirect reprisal, that United States strategic interests
are in no immediate danger of cartelization of the minerals at
issue, that it would violate the notion of deep seabed resources as
the "common heritage of mankind," and that it would jeopardize
the long-range interest of the United States.8
Whether it is undertaken unilaterally or in a manner finally
prescribed by treaty, seabed mining will likely begin sooner or
later and may affect State interests in a variety of possible ways:
environmental disruption, onshore processing, transportation,
altered resource and job markets, and revenue gains and losses.
But aside from discussion of some strategic and market interests,
little attention has been devoted to the strictly domestic aspects
of deep seabed mining. In this area, too, precedent drawn from the
experience of expanding the territorial sea would provide the
framework within which to take up the question of deep seabed
mining as a component in an oceans policy.
B. Federalism
Beyond what is minimally necessary to effect it, an expanded
territorial sea would be part of and occasion for development of a
comprehensive oceans policy. In addition, the territorial sea in
particular and oceans policy in general confront us with fun-
damental questions about federalism. An ordering of Federal-
State relations in the governance of marine resources has been
due but not forthcoming at least since the Truman Proclamations
of 1945. In fact marine resources expose and make acute some
unresolved Federal-State issues of very longstanding. As pro-
jected onto the oceans, a Federal-State balance has been sought
according to one or both of two standards of measurement.
According to one standard of measurement, the further
seaward the marine area lies, the more preponderant the Federal
67 I
" See generally Raymond, Seabed Minerals and the U.S. Economy: A Second Look, 123
CONG. REC. E 733 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977); DISCOVERY II, Note 66 supra at 1, 3.
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interests become. 9 As the focus moves landward, according to this
standard, State interests gain in importance. Thus, Federal in-
terests are given greatest weight in the high seas and deep sea-
bed; those of the States greatest weight in the coastal and inland
areas.
According to the other standard, where there is need for na-
tional uniformity, Federal interests prevail.70 Where there is need
for a local approach, then the States are to be dominant.
There is truth, utility and age to both approaches. But both are
ultimately inadequate to the realities which they are employed to
determine. The weight-of-interest/seaward-distance configuration
breaks down at both ends. The national interest in defense, for ex-
ample, is no less weighty at the landward than at the seaward ex-
treme. 1 One assumes as great a national defense interest in
Baltimore as in the Baltimore Canyon. Or, to cite a State-oriented
example, Washington has as much interest in salmon at the fur-
thest extent of their migratory pattern as exists in them when
they return to spawn in State waters. A weighting of Federal and
State interests cannot always be carried out according to
geographical distance.
The other test, that of uniformity, has its own, several short-
comings. The linkage of Federal priority with uniformity is not
always supportable in fact or in theory.72 Factually, Federal agen-
cies may lack capacity for disinterested uniformity if they have
taken as their mission, as some have, the protection of parochial,
bureaucratic interests. Theoretically, the national interest war-
ranting Federal priority may lie in diversity rather than in unifor-
mity. (A State, for example, may be unable to protect or even
recognize the value and uniqueness of a coastal resource like
estuaries absent the perspective and intervention of the Federal
government.) The marriage of central government and uniformity
also does not take full account of the possibility that States may
best protect the national interest in uniformity. State priority
might be especially appropriate where the uniformity propounded
" Such a scale underlies the majority's reasoning in United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19 (1947). See id. at 35-36. Compare id. at 42-43 (Reed, J., dissenting); 44-45 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
7 This standard originated in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
"' Cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 44-45 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7 Cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 174-177 (1978).
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by a Federal agency is either a narrow interest writ large or a
surrender to the lowest common standard of regulation.
The Civil War and the constitutional amendments which follow-
ed, as well as subsequent events, have settled many questions
about the value and role of the Union in the protection of civil
rights. It will not gainsay the achievements of the past to observe
that, in a different age and in the different context of natural
resources, the relationships of the States to each other and to the
Federal government are not unworthy of contemporary examina-
tion. This is not to say that present prerogatives could or ought to
be altered. The structure might be left untouched after thorough
reconsideration. It is to say that oceans policy, or its absence, does
mirror confusion in Federal-State relations and that an extension
of the territorial sea could be the medium for putting these rela-
tions in good and decent order. This is especially so at a time
when State governors and State personnel are increasing the
governmental competence and capacity of the States.
VI. CONCLUSION-CONTINUATION OF THE AMERICAN
EXPERIMENT
Should the UNCLOS fail in all else, it will have succeeded
significantly in discovering to the world the fact that the sea is
primarily a political subject and only secondarily environmental,
technological, scientific, economic, and legal. The deployment of
marine resources depends upon prior political judgment: who
makes the decision about ends, and how? In the United States
these judgments belong to the people.
The ocean is a particularly fit subject for our politics for it is
essentially popular. For many years since, the sea has had pur-
chase in the romantic imagination. It will have a future hold upon
the public fisc. And it has determinative, present bearing upon
the stability of our environment and our energy consumption.
Moreover, ocean affairs are singularly in the public domain. An-
ciently and modernly, the sea has been viewed in terms which
distinguish it in this regard. Different marine areas and resources
have been recognized variously as res communis,3 as the subject
of public trust" or as the common heritage of mankind." It is a
" JUSTINIAN. INSTITUTES. Lib. 11, tit. 1, at 90 (Sandars transl. 7th ed. 1962).
, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
," The conception is that of Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta and is embodied in
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resource of and for the people. The more interesting and net-
tlesome question is whether it can be a resource governable by
the people.
The questions about the boundaries and uses of the territorial
sea, about oceans policy and about federalism can always be
removed from public judgment so that we may have decision-
making of and for the people, but by, at best, an elite. This will be
the result if the questions are not discerned, or if discerned, are
abandoned to experts, managers, time, or market forces.
Not the least of the advantages which commend the territorial
sea issue to the citizenry is the absence of pre-emptive claim to it.
It is still open to meaningful public discussion and action, and is
timely arrived if timely seized.
Expansion of the territorial sea could be taken as the opportunity
for an experiment with popular participation in what Thomas Jef-
ferson called "the government of affairs."76 Even the process of in-
forming and making the requisite public decisions about boun-
daries, uses and ends could itself be momentous.
To enjoy any prospect of a successful outcome, such a process
would necessarily engage the public as citizens rather than as in-
terest group counters. The pursuit and clash of competing in-
terests can yield at best a temporary armistice of contending
wills. The exercise of citizenship, on the other hand, entertains
thought in broad categories about long-term consequences. It is
the kind of thinking which rises above narrow interests, which
generates fruitful policy, and which is the pre-condition to solution
of specific problems like those we face with fish, oil and federal-
ism.
Perhaps, as individuals, we have not completely reconciled or
recently reflected upon the dual responsibility of our
simultaneous Federal and State citizenship. Oceans policy and the
problems of Federal-State relations depend for resolution upon
how each citizen recognizes and meets the duties of double citizen-
ship.
Our federalism is precisely an order for making and giving ef-
fect to citizen decisions. The consultation of public opinion polls in
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
"' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), reprinted in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 660, 661 (Koch & Peden eds. 1944).
[Vol. 9:1
SEA CHANGES
the making of governmental choices and the recent resort to
referenda in limiting property taxes ought to serve as reminders
of the dangers of unstructured rule by plebiscite. Representative,
republican government, when it really is that, is much to be
preferred.
An experiment of citizen engagement in the structured, dialogic
process of governing the affairs of the territorial sea might pro-
duce not only a legitimate oceans policy but also a renewal of the
Federal-State enterprise. If it did, then it would be remarkably in-
structive for such other policies and choices as those concerning
energy, natural resources generally, and foreign relations, all of
which pose severe challenges to federalism in an age of scarcity.
Moreover, a United States success in this setting would furnish a
much-needed model to the international community as it wrestles
with the means of governance of Antarctica, outer space and the
deep seabed.
Alexander Hamilton proposed that it had been reserved to the
American people to decide the question, "whether societies of men
are really capable or not of establishing good government from
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to de-
pend . .. on accident and force."77 Paradigmatically, the territorial
sea and the development of an oceans policy offer again the
possibility of good government from reflection and choice. This
possibility is the greatest contribution which the continuing
American experiment can make to the world community.
11 THE FEDERALIST No. 1 at 3 (Hamilton) (Cooke ed. 1961).
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